On April 15th, the Sudan conflict entered its third year since fighting broke out between the Sudanese Army (SA) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), in what has become one of the worst ongoing conflicts in the world with a humanitarian crisis “of industrial proportions.”
According to aid agencies, the devastating conflict has led to the deaths of thousands of people, combatants and civilians alike, and untold suffering.It has also led to the displacement of nearly 13 million people, some multiple times, both internally and externally, according to the UN Refugee Agency.With no end in sight, internal and external players in the conflict have little incentive to halt hostilities and find a political solution to a conflict that will redefine Sudan’s future more than the end of Omar al-Bashir’s three decade rule in 2019.
“As a direct result of the actions of the SAF and the RSF, the people of Sudan, especially women and children, are enduring the world’s largest humanitarian and displacement crises, and continued atrocities, including widespread conflict-related sexual violence, ethnically motivated attacks and reprisal killings,” the G7 Foreign Ministers said in a statement on Wednesday.
The conflict has led to an influx in refugees, both as internally displaced persons and as refugees in neighbouring countries, especially Egypt, Chad, South Sudan, Uganda, the Central African Republic and Libya. Over 70, 000 people have fled into Uganda, which does not share a border with Sudan, placing extra pressure as the country is also a destination for refugees fleeing the multiple conflicts in eastern DRC.
For South Sudan, the risk of the conflict spilling over is more likely now than it was when it begun two years ago. South Sudan has its own brewing conflict, and the presence of at least two splinter groups of its current ruling SPLM illustrates the real risk that the two conflicts could eventually intertwine.
But Juba’s concerns are primarily economic at this point, since its oil pipeline passes through Sudan. Whoever holds Khartoum has an economic interest in keeping South Sudan’s oil flowing, which has forced Juba to play a delicate balancing game in the conflict.
“A Humanitarian Crisis of Industrial Proportions”
The conflict has created multiple overlapping health and economic emergencies. According to the Médecins Sans Frontières, in addition to trauma injuries as a direct result of the ongoing conflict, Sudan is also experiencing emergencies including widespread malnourishment, outbreaks of measles, cholera, and diphtheria.
“With no viable peace in sight, the Sudanese are trapped in a humanitarian crisis of industrial proportions,” said Jens Laerke, spokesperson for the UN aid coordination office, OCHA.
Sudan has been an atypically unstable country, even in a continent where coups are not too uncommon. Since it gained independence in 1956, it has had at least 20 documented coup attempts, and military rule has been more common than civilian democratic rule.
The end of al-Bashir’s three decade rule in 2019 initially triggered hope for a peaceful democratic future, which was temporarily marked by civilian rule. After the RSF and SAF jointly overthrew the civilian government, one likely future was a return to extended military authoritarian rule under a junta.
But the breakdown in relations between SAF head Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and RSF Gen. Mohamed Hamdan “Hemedti” Dagalo in 2023 created the current devastating conflict. In March 2025, the SAF took back control of the capital Khartoum after it had been under RSF control. The exit of the latter from the capital has made it refocus its efforts on the Darfur State, which has long been a flashpoint for the country’s multiple strifes, and tightened its siege on El Fasher in North Darfur.
“The warring parties are not only failing to protect civilians — they are actively compounding their suffering,” says Claire San Filippo, MSF Emergency Coordinator. “Wherever you look in Sudan, you will find needs — overwhelming, urgent, and unmet.”
What Would a Viable Peace Look Like?
Internal conflicts in Africa rarely have clean, clear, lasting victories. There are multiple internal and external interests, and therefore possible futures, for what happens in Sudan over the next months and years.
The most immediate one seems to be a continuation in the conflict, since mediation efforts, international sanctions and other levers by regional and international players have come to nought. With both sides armed to the teeth and still escalating, this seems like the more likely future in the short-term, as each tries to achieve a clear victory over the other that would buttress aa political or likely military administration.
Internally, the RSF has tried to cobble together a political wing, including in controversial meetings in Nairobi in February and March. The move indicates that it is increasingly realising that a military victory, even though implausible at this point, would be at best a pyrrhic victory for either side before the cycles starts again.
There are tensions and competition among different political groups in the country, including the pro-democracy organisations that toppled Bashir’s regime and the Islamist loyalists who want to restore the military authoritarianism that defined that regime. Both sides are supported by militias, and there are several small armed groups engaged in conflict with one or both of the main sides.
Externally, the SAF has accused Kenya of siding with the RSF, and banned all imports from Kenya to Sudan. The allegations culminated in March 2025, but had long been suspected, especially after RSF leader Gen. Hemedti went on a shuttle diplomacy in the region that saw him visit South Africa, Rwanda, Ethiopia, Kenya, Djibouti, and Uganda.
SAF’s ability to hold on has seen Russia, Ethiopia, and several other external players switch sides over the course of the conflict. Its retaking of Khartoum has bolstered its position, but it still cannot claim a clear victory over the RSF.
The RSF has received support from the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and other countries interested in either the gold and mineral mines it controls, its spheres of influence, or the not near-implausible likelihood that it could build the future government of Sudan.
The SAF has in turn been supported by Saudi Arabia and a broad coalition including Egypt, Iran, and Qatar. Moscow, engaged in its own conflict with Ukraine and also reeling under international sanctions, has switched sides at least once to bolster its geopolitical ambitions.
In these facets, the conflict has become a patchwork of the multiple interests and competitions going on in East Africa and the Horn, the Gulf, and Eastern Europe. This means that there is little incentive for the external players to let Sudan find a peaceful solution quickly, as long as the two warring factions can keep jockeying for control of the geopolitically critical country.
The alternative is no end to the conflict any time soon, which will likely worsen the country’s lasting cycles of violence, creating the perfect breeding ground for a brutal strongman, or a failed state in all but name.